lemo-opuscar
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 27, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill directs the agent and user to download and install a Claude plugin and clone a repository from an external, non-trusted GitHub account (
github.com/lemomo-ai/lemo-opuscar). - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The provided instructions use shell commands (
claude plugin install lemo-opuscar@lemolab) to fetch and execute third-party code within the agent's environment, which constitutes a remote code execution risk when the source is not a verified or trusted vendor. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The documentation includes shell commands for plugin management (
marketplace add,plugin install) and suggests cloning repositories, which can lead to arbitrary code execution if the upstream content is compromised. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill's primary workflow involves generating and executing Canvas and WebGL code at runtime to render video frames. This dynamic code generation and execution is a powerful capability that could be abused if malicious logic is injected.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted user input (themes, stories, and styles) to drive the automated video 'Director' and code generation logic.
- Ingestion points: User-provided themes and story descriptions in the
SKILL.mdworkflow. - Boundary markers: None. There are no delimiters or warnings to the agent to ignore instructions embedded within the user's story content.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to write and execute code, interact with the file system to save MP4 files, and invoke plugin tools.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the user-provided narrative content is specified before it is used to influence the code generation process.
Audit Metadata