lemo-opuscar

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 27, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill directs the agent and user to download and install a Claude plugin and clone a repository from an external, non-trusted GitHub account (github.com/lemomo-ai/lemo-opuscar).
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The provided instructions use shell commands (claude plugin install lemo-opuscar@lemolab) to fetch and execute third-party code within the agent's environment, which constitutes a remote code execution risk when the source is not a verified or trusted vendor.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The documentation includes shell commands for plugin management (marketplace add, plugin install) and suggests cloning repositories, which can lead to arbitrary code execution if the upstream content is compromised.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill's primary workflow involves generating and executing Canvas and WebGL code at runtime to render video frames. This dynamic code generation and execution is a powerful capability that could be abused if malicious logic is injected.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted user input (themes, stories, and styles) to drive the automated video 'Director' and code generation logic.
  • Ingestion points: User-provided themes and story descriptions in the SKILL.md workflow.
  • Boundary markers: None. There are no delimiters or warnings to the agent to ignore instructions embedded within the user's story content.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to write and execute code, interact with the file system to save MP4 files, and invoke plugin tools.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the user-provided narrative content is specified before it is used to influence the code generation process.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 27, 2026, 10:32 AM