sdlc-init
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 11, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill implements a mechanism to load additional instructions from a path computed at runtime. It checks for an environment variable
$POWERSUIT_OVERLAYand instructs the agent to read and follow files within that directory, explicitly stating that the overlay content should take precedence over the skill's own instructions. - Evidence:
[ -n "$POWERSUIT_OVERLAY" ] && ls -1 "$POWERSUIT_OVERLAY/sdlc" 2>/dev/null || trueand the subsequent instruction: "Where the overlay and this file disagree, follow the overlay." - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
rsynccommand to copy template files into the repository. While it targets the plugin's own root directory, it represents an automated file system modification using shell commands. - Evidence:
rsync -a --ignore-existing "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/templates/" ./inSKILL.md. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill identifies "modules" by scanning for specific files and is instructed to read content from the
$POWERSUIT_OVERLAYdirectory. If an attacker can influence these files, they could potentially inject malicious instructions into the agent's context. - Ingestion points: Reads project files (e.g.,
docs/docs.json,gate/gate.json) and external overlay files ($POWERSUIT_OVERLAY/sdlc/README.md). - Boundary markers: None specified for the ingested content.
- Capability inventory: Shell execution (
rsync,ls) and file writing (docs/sdlc.md). - Sanitization: The skill does not explicitly mention sanitizing or escaping the content read from these external files before using it to fill
docs/sdlc.mdor following its instructions.
Audit Metadata