agent-reputation-benchmark
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its processing of untrusted external data.
- Ingestion points: Public review text and Google Business Profile data fetched via the
local/searchandmaps/searchtools (referenced inSKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None explicitly defined in the instructions to separate external review text from the agent's instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill can read local files (
.agents/product-marketing.md) and perform network operations via the UnifAPI MCP server. - Sanitization: No specific sanitization or filtering of the review text is mentioned before the agent analyzes it for 'neighborhood language' or 'velocity'.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses local files that may contain marketing configurations or product strategies.
- Evidence: Instructions in
SKILL.md(Workflow Step 1) direct the agent to read.agents/product-marketing.mdand.claude/product-marketing.mdif they exist. While these are likely intended for configuration, accessing hidden dot-files is a pattern associated with data collection. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides installation instructions that involve executing code from an external repository.
- Evidence: The
README.mdfile suggests runningnpx skills add unifapi-agent/agents. This command downloads and executes code. However, the package belongs to the skill's official author ('unifapi-agent'), which aligns with standard vendor distribution practices.
Audit Metadata