migrate-config-to-opus-5
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from user configuration files and project repositories to perform audits. Maliciously crafted instructions within these files could potentially influence the behavior of the agent or its subagents during the migration process.
- Ingestion points: Reads global configuration from
~/.claude(includingCLAUDE.md,rules/,settings.json) and project-level configuration files. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded prompts within the audited files.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to modify configuration files, perform git commits, and execute shell commands (
python3,claudeCLI). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the external file content before it is processed by the agent's logic.
- [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill is designed to access and modify the sensitive global Claude Code configuration directory (
~/.claude). This access is consistent with the skill's primary purpose of migrating configuration settings across model versions. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes local shell commands for operational tasks, such as using
python3to validate JSON integrity of updated settings files and invoking theclaudeCLI to verify that updated configurations load correctly.
Audit Metadata