jira-administration
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches manifest and configuration files from an external repository for data reconciliation.
- Evidence: Phase 4 of the instance migration mode downloads
jira-required.yamlfrom a GitHub repository to compare local workspace requirements with upstream templates. - Context: The download targets a well-known service domain and is used for metadata comparison rather than direct code execution.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive file paths and environment variables required to manage Jira authentication and configuration.
- Sensitive paths: The skill references
~/.config/aclifor machine-global session data and.envforATLASSIAN_EMAILandATLASSIAN_API_TOKEN. - Context: These accesses are necessary for the skill's primary purpose of Jira administration and are accompanied by explicit instructions on secret hygiene and avoiding broad output of sensitive tokens.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data from external Jira instances, which could theoretically contain malicious instructions embedded in project metadata or issue fields.
- Ingestion points: Data is ingested from Jira via API calls and helper scripts that read components, epics, stories, custom fields, and workflows.
- Boundary markers: The skill mandates a strict 'read-first' policy and requires explicit user confirmation before any mutations are applied.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses local scripts for data processing, performs network requests to Jira, and updates local configuration files in the
.agents/directory. - Sanitization: Input sanitization for Jira fields is not explicitly detailed, but the human-in-the-loop approval process for generated plans serves as a primary mitigation.
Audit Metadata