judgment-day
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its automated processing of untrusted external data to drive code-writing agents.
- Ingestion points: The skill explicitly reads untrusted content including diffs, file targets, PR descriptions, and Jira tickets as defined in the SKILL.md input sequence.
- Boundary markers: The templates in references/prompts-and-formats.md for the Judge and Fix Agent prompts lack explicit boundary markers, delimiters, or negative constraints to prevent the LLM from following instructions embedded within the target files or descriptions.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to modify the local filesystem by delegating tasks to a Fix Agent (described in SKILL.md execution steps) that is instructed to apply changes to the codebase.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, escaping, or validation of external content before it is interpolated into the prompts for the judge or fix agents.
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