pr-review-lead
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data which could contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent's behavior or the content of its reviews.
- Ingestion points: The skill fetches pull request diffs, metadata (title, body, commits), and external doctrine files using the
ghCLI as described inreferences/evidence-and-doctrine-lookup.mdandSKILL.mdStep 2. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions to use delimiters or ignore instructions embedded within the ingested data, which increases the surface for indirect injection.
- Capability inventory: The skill can perform shell commands, write to local scratchpad files, and post comments to GitHub repositories using
gh pr commentas specified inreferences/output-and-posting-flow.md. - Sanitization: The instructions do not mention any sanitization, filtering, or escaping of the ingested PR content before it is processed by the LLM for analysis.
- Mitigating Factor: The skill implements a robust human-in-the-loop workflow in Steps 5 and 7 of
SKILL.md, requiring the user to triage findings and provide explicit confirmation before posting feedback, which prevents autonomous execution of injected instructions.
Audit Metadata