project-discovery
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from external sources, creating a potential attack surface where malicious instructions within a target repository could influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Target repository source code, README files, and external documentation such as Confluence or Notion exports (SKILL.md §Inputs).
- Boundary markers: The skill does not explicitly define delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the ingested content, although it uses a structured output format for findings.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands (
gh,bun,ls,grep,find,curl) and write files to the.context/directory (SKILL.md §Compact Rules). - Sanitization: The skill contains explicit rules against pasting detected credentials into its output and uses a 'Discovery Gaps' section to manage unverified information (SKILL.md §Gotchas).
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of system commands to discover the project's structure, tech stack, and environment configuration.
- Evidence: Executes
ls,grep,find,cat, andjqfor file system analysis;ghfor repository metadata; andbun runfor internal scripts likejira:checkandcontext:map(SKILL.md, references/phase-1-constitution.md). These are used within the scope of its primary purpose. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references documentation and methodology from external URLs belonging to the vendor.
- Evidence: Links to
upexgalaxy.com/metodologiaandupexgalaxy.com/en/methodologyfor methodology guidance (SKILL.md). These are legitimate vendor resources and do not contribute to a higher severity verdict.
Audit Metadata