test-documentation
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external, untrusted data from Jira issues and local logs, creating a surface for instructions embedded in that data to influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: The workflow in
SKILL.md(Phase 1) andreferences/discovery-intake.mdinstructs the agent to read User Story descriptions, Acceptance Criteria (AC), and Jira comments to derive test scenarios. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit prompt delimiters or instructions defined to isolate the ingested Jira content from the agent's internal control instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses extensive write capabilities in the target TMS environment, utilizing
[ISSUE_TRACKER_TOOL]and[TMS_TOOL]to create, link, and transition Jira/Xray issues. - Sanitization: As a primary security control, the skill implements a mandatory human "signature" requirement (described in
SKILL.mdandreferences/tms-conventions.md) before any automation verdict is finalized or promoted, effectively placing a manual review gate on the most critical actions.
Audit Metadata