pr-review-lead
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted input from external pull requests, including code diffs, descriptions, and commit messages. This data is ingested via GitHub CLI (
gh pr view,gh pr diff) and processed by the agent to generate review findings. - Ingestion Points: The PR metadata and file patches are read into the context during Step 2 of the review process.
- Boundary Markers: While no specific delimiters are used to isolate the diff content from instructions, the skill's persona is strictly defined as a reviewer.
- Capability Inventory: The agent has the ability to read repository content and post PR comments using the
ghtool. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization of the PR content is performed before analysis.
- Mitigation: The skill employs a strong human-in-the-loop (HITL) mechanism. Step 5 (Triage) and Step 7 (Confirm, then post) ensure the user reviews all findings and drafts before any external command is executed to post the feedback. This prevents malicious instructions within a PR from successfully hijacking the agent's actions without user oversight.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on shell commands via the GitHub CLI (
gh) to perform its primary function. - Evidence: It uses commands such as
gh pr view,gh pr diff,gh api, andgh pr commentfor data retrieval and interaction. - Execution Method: The skill uses a scratchpad file and heredocs (
<< 'EOF') to safely assemble the feedback comment before posting, which mitigates shell injection risks from the generated markdown content.
Audit Metadata