project-discovery
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function is to read, analyze, and summarize untrusted data from a target repository (source code, READMEs, configurations) to generate architecture and requirement documents. This process exposes the agent to potentially malicious instructions embedded in the target project's files.
- Ingestion points: Project repository files including
README.md,package.json, and source code as described inSKILL.mdunder 'Inputs'. - Boundary markers: The skill advises the agent to note 'Discovery Gaps' for unverified information but does not define explicit delimiters or 'ignore' instructions for the ingested repository data.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes shell commands (
ls,grep,cat,find), repository metadata tools (gh), and can write to the local.context/directory. - Sanitization: The instructions explicitly direct the agent to 'cite each claim' and 'never fabricate', grounding the output in verifiable evidence.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill leverages a wide range of shell commands to inspect the target repository's file structure, tech stack, and security posture. While these are read-only and localized to the target repository path, they represent a significant capability surface used for automated reverse-engineering.
- Evidence: Comprehensive command lists for tech stack detection and codebase exploration are found in
references/phase-1-constitution.mdandreferences/phase-3-infrastructure.md. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill facilitates the use of
bun run api:sync, which may download OpenAPI or Swagger specifications from remote URLs to synchronize technical endpoint definitions. While a standard development practice, this involves fetching data from external network sources. - Evidence: This capability is detailed in
references/context-generators.mdandreferences/phase-2-srs.md.
Audit Metadata