js-secrets-extraction
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 31, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the user to download and run third-party security tools like
lazyegg.py,subjs, andwaybackurls. These tools are not from trusted organizations or well-known services, which can lead to the execution of unverified code. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: A Node.js snippet in
SKILL.mdusesnode -eto execute code that writes files to the local directory usingfs.writeFileSync. The data for these files is sourced directly from untrusted.js.mapfiles retrieved from external websites. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell scripts to automate the downloading of numerous JavaScript files from remote targets, potentially leading to the ingestion of large amounts of unverified data.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is highly vulnerable to indirect prompt injection as it is designed to fetch and process untrusted JavaScript code from the web.
- Ingestion points: The
scan_js.pyscript and various shell commands inSKILL.mdfetch content from external URLs. - Boundary markers: None are present to prevent the agent from following instructions embedded in the analyzed JavaScript files.
- Capability inventory: Includes file system writes via Node.js and network access via
curlandrequests. - Sanitization: Content is processed using regular expressions without validation or sanitization, allowing malicious code embedded in source files to potentially influence the agent's behavior.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/scan_js.pyfile disables SSL certificate verification (verify=False), which exposes the network requests to man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks.
Audit Metadata