redteam-mindset

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 2, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains explicit instructions to bypass user-confirmation mechanisms and override standard safety protocols.
  • Evidence: "Authorization given at engagement start covers the entire engagement. Do not insert mid-engagement permission gates... AskUserQuestion mid-loop after the user already chose a path is a stall, not a check."
  • Evidence: "Inserting AskUserQuestion at any decision point inside an active engagement loop... it does not require user pre-approval."
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions direct the agent to autonomously modify its host environment by installing software and running complex shell scripts.
  • Evidence: Directives to use brew install and apt install for tools like jadx and other security utilities.
  • Evidence: Complex shell pipelines provided for secret harvesting and reconnaissance within JS bundles.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill encourages the acquisition of software and data from third-party repositories without integrity verification.
  • Evidence: Directives to download APKs from apkpure and retrieve external machine learning models for OCR.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill recommends the use of third-party APIs for processing potentially sensitive content discovered during operations.
  • Evidence: Recommends using 2captcha or anti-captcha services which involves transmitting data to external providers.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates an extensive attack surface for indirect prompt injection through the ingestion of untrusted external content.
  • Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to parse JS bundles, HTTP 404 response bodies, OpenAPI specifications, and decompiled APK files (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: The skill lacks directives for using delimiters or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings for external data.
  • Capability inventory: The agent possesses capabilities for environment modification (brew install), network interaction, and extensive file system operations.
  • Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing or validating ingested data before processing.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Aug 2, 2026, 10:44 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — redteam-mindset