voice-profile
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from social media via the
list_channel_poststool and saves it directly into a local voice profile file without sanitization. This file is specifically designed to be read by other writing agents, creating a surface where malicious instructions hidden in a user's previous posts could influence the behavior of other AI agents in the same workspace. - Ingestion points: External content fetched via
list_channel_postsinSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent; the content is placed under a '## Examples' header but lacks explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write to the filesystem at
~/.uplika/<workspace-slug>/voice.md. - Sanitization: No sanitization, filtering, or escaping is performed on the content fetched from the external tool.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions direct the agent to interact with the local filesystem (
~/.uplika/) to create directories, read files, and save content. While the path is scoped to a vendor-specific subdirectory, this represents a persistent modification of the user's environment based on external and user-supplied data.
Audit Metadata