strix-pentest
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 6, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the user or agent to install the Strix tool by downloading a script from
https://strix.ai/installand piping it directly intobash. This pattern executes remote code with the full privileges of the current user environment without prior local inspection. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs several network operations to external domains including
strix.aifor software installation andapp.strix.aifor Cloud API interaction, asset registration, and data retrieval. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
strixCLI tool to perform scanning operations and executes various shell commands for Docker status checks and environment variable configuration (e.g.,export STRIX_LLM,export LLM_API_KEY). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it is designed to ingest and process data from untrusted external sources.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via target URLs, repository URLs, and local file paths passed to the
--targetor--mountarguments inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define clear boundaries or delimiters to separate instructions from the data found at the target locations.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute subprocesses (via the
strixCLI) and perform network operations (viacurlto the Cloud API). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering to prevent malicious instructions embedded in a target codebase or web page from influencing the agent's behavior during a scan.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://strix.ai/install - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata