mcp-skill-gen
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 13, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill employs a dangerous execution pattern by instructing the agent to download and run a shell script directly from GitHub (
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/vaayne/mcphub/main/scripts/install.sh) usingcurl | sh. This pattern bypasses verification of the script's contents before execution. This instruction appears in the prerequisites of the mainSKILL.mdand is also embedded inreferences/skill-template.md, ensuring that any skill generated by this tool will continue to use this unverified execution method. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of the
mhCLI tool to perform discovery and invocation tasks. Specifically, the 'Stdio mode' described in the workflow executes arbitrary commands (mh list --stdio -- cmd args ...) provided as part of the MCP server configuration. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting and processing data from external MCP servers.
- Ingestion points: External data enters the context through
mh listcalls to remote URLs or provided config files as seen inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: No boundary markers or protective instructions are used when interpolating external tool data into the generated skill templates.
- Capability inventory: The skill can perform file system writes (creating new skill directories and
SKILL.mdfiles) and execute shell commands via themhutility. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the names, descriptions, or tool schemas retrieved from MCP servers before they are used to generate new skill files.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/vaayne/mcphub/main/scripts/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata