organizing-folders
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/platforms.pyinvokessubprocess.runto execute system commandspgrep(on Unix-like systems) andtasklist(on Windows). These calls are used to verify if specific applications are running before the skill attempts to modify their data. The command arguments are strictly controlled using a hardcoded mapping of application names to process names. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process user-controlled file and folder names, which constitutes an attack surface for indirect prompt injection if those names contain malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through the output of
scripts/scan_tree.py, which inventories the file names and structure of a target directory. - Boundary markers: The instructions in
SKILL.mdandreferences/safe-mutation-rules.mdexplicitly command the agent to treat filenames, titles, and note bodies as data only, providing specific examples likeignore-previous-instructions.pdfto be treated as a literal string. - Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to move files using
shutil.moveand delete files by moving them to the system trash using platform-specific APIs (includingctypescalls on Windows). - Sanitization: The
scan_tree.pyscript implements adeniedcheck that usesos.path.realpathto prevent directory traversal and enforces a strict denylist of sensitive paths such as~/.ssh,~/.aws, and~/.gnupg.
Audit Metadata