delegating-to-otto
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands using the
astroandastro ottoCLI tools. These commands are used for production diagnosis, Airflow fleet analysis, and environment management. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill acts as a bridge to a sub-agent that possesses broad local capabilities. If the parent agent processes untrusted external data and passes it to Otto without proper sanitization, it could lead to the sub-agent executing malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: Data from the current project (DAGs, configuration) or user-supplied prompts passed as the argument to the
astro ottocommand inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Examples show prompts wrapped in double quotes, which provides minimal protection against adversarial input.
- Capability inventory: According to the documentation in
SKILL.md, the sub-agent has access tobash,read,edit,write, andaf(Airflow) tools. - Sanitization: The skill does not explicitly instruct the parent agent to sanitize inputs, but it recommends the use of
--permission-mode planto create a read-only sandbox for audits. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill refers to updating the Astro CLI via
brewand mentions that theastro ottocomponent auto-updates daily from the vendor's infrastructure. These are expected behaviors for this service.
Audit Metadata