company-radar
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it processes and summarizes untrusted data from various public web platforms.
- Ingestion points: Data is retrieved from external sources such as Twitter, Reddit, and Hacker News in
SKILL.md(Steps 3a and 4). - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit boundary markers or instructions for the agent to ignore potentially malicious commands embedded in the retrieved web data when generating AI briefings in Step 6.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to execute shell commands, run a local Node.js script, and perform network requests via Tavily.
- Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of the retrieved web content is documented before the data is interpolated into prompts.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands and a local script to perform its core functions.
- Evidence:
SKILL.md(Step 1) uses bash scripts to check for the presence of required environment variables likeTAVILY_API_KEYandGITHUB_TOKEN. - Evidence:
SKILL.md(Step 5) executes the bundled scriptnode scripts/heat-score-calc.mjsto process company signal data and generate scores. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation provides instructions for installing components from external sources associated with the author.
- Evidence:
README.mdsuggests installation usingnpxfrom the@opendirectory.devpackage scope and downloading content from theVarnan-TechGitHub organization.
Audit Metadata