graphic-slide-deck
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell commands to manage files and execute auxiliary scripts.
- Evidence: Executes
mkdir -p,open,bash, andpythonto perform deck generation, PDF export, and PowerPoint extraction. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill initiates external downloads to set up its execution environment.
- Evidence: The
export-pdf.shscript automatically installs the Playwright browser automation library when first run. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection by processing untrusted data.
- Ingestion points: Processes user-provided notes, URLs, and uploaded PowerPoint files (via
extract-pptx.py) inSKILL.mdStep 1 and Step 5. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are used to prevent the agent from following commands embedded in the processed content.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to shell execution (
bash,python), file system operations (mkdir,open), and network deployment (Vercel). - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the ingested content is specified before it is used to draft slide copy or determine deck structure.
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill depends on and executes code from an external directory on the host machine.
- Evidence: It hardcodes paths to a sibling directory
/Users/ksd/Desktop/Varnan_skills/frontend-slides/to execute shell and Python scripts for core functionality like PDF export, deployment, and file extraction.
Audit Metadata