kill-the-standup
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes
curland the GitHub CLI (gh) to interact with external APIs. It correctly handles variable data by writing the Slack payload to a temporary file (/tmp/standup-payload.json) and using the@parameter incurl. This practice mitigates shell injection risks that could arise from processing external content such as commit messages or issue titles.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains an indirect prompt injection surface because it processes untrusted data from external APIs (Linear and GitHub).\n - Ingestion points: Linear issue titles and GitHub commit messages are read into the agent's context (SKILL.md, Steps 2 and 3).\n
- Boundary markers: The skill does not use specific delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the ingested text.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to network operations (
curl) and local file writes (cat > /tmp/...).\n - Sanitization: While the skill applies structural formatting (first-line extraction, deduplication), it does not sanitize the content of the titles or messages. The risk is categorized as low as the agent is constrained by strict formatting rules in
references/standup-format.md.
Audit Metadata