meeting-brief-generator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its core functionality of processing untrusted data from the web.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via Tavily API search results in
SKILL.md(Step 3). - Boundary markers: The search results are interpolated into a string within a JSON payload for the Gemini API (
SKILL.mdStep 4) without robust delimiters or explicit instructions to ignore embedded commands in the source data. - Capability inventory: The skill uses
curlfor API requests and has the ability to write output to a Notion database. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the external search content before it is processed by the Gemini model.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
curlto interact with official APIs for Tavily, Google Gemini, and Notion. These operations are performed using environment variables for authentication and target well-known service endpoints.
Audit Metadata