newsletter-digest

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 15, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection as it processes untrusted data from external RSS feeds which are then summarized by the AI.
  • Ingestion points: The scripts/fetch-feeds.js script fetches content from URLs defined in feeds.json.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The synthesis prompt in SKILL.md (Step 4) interpolates article content directly into the instruction block without robust delimiters to distinguish source data from instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The agent can execute shell commands via Node.js scripts and has file system access to read/write temporary JSON data.
  • Sanitization: scripts/fetch-feeds.js performs basic HTML stripping for excerpts, but no sanitization or escaping is performed on the text to prevent embedded prompt instructions from influencing the LLM.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local JavaScript files using Node.js to perform core logic. Notable findings include:
  • Hardcoded paths: SKILL.md uses absolute paths (e.g., /Users/ksd/Desktop/Varnan_skills/newsletter-digest/) for script execution and file checks, which may cause errors or path traversal risks in different environments.
  • Verification logic: The agent is instructed to run node -e to manually parse and verify the JSON output of the fetch script.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill programmatically fetches data from external RSS/Atom feed URLs specified in the feeds.json configuration file.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
May 15, 2026, 05:52 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — newsletter-digest