position-me
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it is designed to ingest and analyze untrusted data from external websites.
- Ingestion points: The agent reads website DOM content,
/llms.txt, and blog posts from arbitrary user-provided or crawled URLs. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings used to separate the external content from the agent's internal logic.
- Capability inventory: The agent can execute a local Python script (
extract_links.py), perform browser automation usingchrome-devtoolsorplaywright, and access the network to fetch data. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of filtering or sanitization of the external content before it is processed in the agent's context.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill invokes a local script
scripts/extract_links.pyto map website architecture. This script usesurllib.request.urlopenon a user-provided URL without validating the protocol, which could potentially be abused to read local files if the agent is directed to use afile://scheme. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references external browser automation tools and MCP servers located at
https://github.com/ChromeDevTools/chrome-devtools-mcp(a well-known service) andhttps://github.com/pasky/chrome-cdp-skill.
Audit Metadata