position-me

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 17, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it is designed to ingest and analyze untrusted data from external websites.
  • Ingestion points: The agent reads website DOM content, /llms.txt, and blog posts from arbitrary user-provided or crawled URLs.
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings used to separate the external content from the agent's internal logic.
  • Capability inventory: The agent can execute a local Python script (extract_links.py), perform browser automation using chrome-devtools or playwright, and access the network to fetch data.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of filtering or sanitization of the external content before it is processed in the agent's context.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill invokes a local script scripts/extract_links.py to map website architecture. This script uses urllib.request.urlopen on a user-provided URL without validating the protocol, which could potentially be abused to read local files if the agent is directed to use a file:// scheme.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references external browser automation tools and MCP servers located at https://github.com/ChromeDevTools/chrome-devtools-mcp (a well-known service) and https://github.com/pasky/chrome-cdp-skill.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jun 17, 2026, 10:41 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — position-me