twitter-GTM-find-Skill
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted tweet content by interpolating it directly into LLM prompts in
scripts/src/extractor.tsandscripts/src/icp-filter.tsfor role and company identification. - Ingestion points: Scraped tweet text and author bio fetched from X/Twitter via the Apify actor in
scripts/src/scraper.ts. - Boundary markers: Tweet content is wrapped in quotes (e.g.,
Tweet Text: "${tweetText}"), but there are no explicit system instructions provided to the model to ignore instructions potentially embedded within the tweet text. - Capability inventory: The extracted data is written to local JSON files (
radar-jobs.jsonandopenclaw-icp-jobs.json) usingfs.writeFileSync. The skill does not execute the scraped data as code or shell commands. - Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering is performed on the tweet text before interpolation into the prompt.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill includes
scripts/run_pipeline.shand instructions inSKILL.mdthat executenpm installandnpx ts-node. These commands are used to install dependencies and run the skill's local TypeScript project. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on several external components:
- Node.js packages are downloaded from the npm registry as specified in
scripts/package.json. - A specific remote Apify actor
ghSpYIW3L1RvT57NTis invoked inscripts/src/scraper.tsandscripts/src/debug.tsto perform the scraping. - The
SKILL.mdfile references third-party pluginsTweetClawandHermes Tweetfrom GitHub as optional components.
Audit Metadata