c-ai-media
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the
Bashtool to execute local scripts (python3 _scripts/gemini-character.py) and perform network operations viacurlfor media processing workflows. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill communicates with the RunPod API (
https://api.runpod.ai) to submit video generation jobs and poll for status updates. RunPod is a well-known AI infrastructure service, and the requests use environment variables for authentication. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection by ingesting untrusted external data from brand reference files.
- Ingestion points: The skill instructions mandate reading style guides and prompt templates from
brands/{brand-slug}/brand-ref.mdto be used as base prompts. - Boundary markers: None; the content from external files is interpolated directly into generation prompts without delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to the
Bashtool, enabling file system access, network operations, and script execution. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of validation, escaping, or filtering applied to the external brand reference data before it enters the agent's context.
Audit Metadata