velt-rest-apis-best-practices
Audited by Socket on Sep 20, 2026
2 alerts found:
Anomalyx2No malicious behavior is evident. The code documents legitimate server-side Velt authentication and permission-management operations and communicates only with the expected Velt API domain. The main security risk is that the sample Next.js route trusts a client-supplied userId without showing authentication or authorization checks; production code should derive the identity from the authenticated session, validate inputs, restrict privileged permission endpoints, check response status and schema, and prevent secret logging.
The fragment is benign webhook documentation and does not show malware or intentional supply-chain compromise. The example handler is security-incomplete: it accepts unauthenticated and unvalidated payloads, logs potentially sensitive metadata, and demonstrates AES-256-CBC without integrity protection. Production implementations should require authentication before processing, validate schemas and event scope, add replay protection, avoid unnecessary PII logging, and use authenticated encryption or an encrypt-then-MAC design.