forge
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill operates by ingesting external, potentially untrusted data to guide its actions.
- Ingestion points: The skill receives an "authorized Changeset Tree, acceptance criteria, constraints, and supporting solution proof" as primary inputs.
- Boundary markers: The instructions do not define specific delimiters or escaping mechanisms to prevent these inputs from influencing the agent's logic beyond the intended scope.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to perform file system mutations (
[CREATE],[MOVE],[UPDATE],[DELETE]) and execute shell commands for git management and verification. - Sanitization: No specific sanitization or validation of the changeset content is described before implementation starts.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the execution of shell commands to perform its core functions.
- Git Management: Explicitly uses
git reset --soft HEAD~1for safe rollbacks. - Toolchain Invocations: Triggers typecheckers, linters, and test suites based on the configuration in
.agents/environment.md. - [SAFE]: The skill documentation includes an explicit security invariant to protect sensitive environment data: "Never inspect or modify secret files (.env*, *.key, *.pem)". This proactively limits the agent's access to credentials during its operation.
Audit Metadata