supporting-content-planner
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 26, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions provide shell commands that directly interpolate user-supplied data into command-line arguments.
- Evidence: In
SKILL.md, theData pullsandOutputsections specify commands such aspython scripts/dfs_client.py ideas --keyword "<pillar-topic>"andpython scripts/report_publish.py <report>.md. - Risk: User-controlled strings for topics or filenames could contain shell metacharacters (e.g.,
;,&&, or|), which could lead to unauthorized command execution if not properly escaped by the platform. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted data from users and external tools without sufficient safeguards.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through the
pillar topic,candidate spoke topics, and the results returned byscripts/dfs_client.py. - Boundary markers: There are no boundary markers or instructions to the agent to treat external content as data rather than instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes shell execution for Python scripts and file system writes for markdown reports.
- Sanitization: No sanitization, validation, or escaping logic is described for the data before it is interpolated into shell commands or content plans.
Audit Metadata