topical-authority-planner
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 26, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill contains instructions to execute shell commands that incorporate user-supplied variables including
<user-domain>,<top-competitor>, and<niche>. - Evidence:
python scripts/dfs_client.py competitors --target "<user-domain>"andpython scripts/dfs_client.py ideas --keyword "<niche>". - Risk: The pattern of wrapping user input in double quotes within a shell command is susceptible to command injection. If a user provides a value like
example.com" ; malicious_command #, the agent would execute the malicious command in the host environment. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from external script outputs and incorporates it into the agent's reasoning process without sanitization.
- Ingestion points: The output of
scripts/dfs_client.py(specifically keyword ideas and competitor ranked data) is used to build the 'Entity map' and 'Subtopic inventory' inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not define delimiters for external data or advise the agent to disregard instructions embedded within the SEO data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write files to the local filesystem and execute a follow-up script (
scripts/report_publish.py) that handles the generated content. - Sanitization: Absent. No filtering, validation, or escaping is performed on the data retrieved from the external SEO analysis before it is processed by the LLM.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata