vercel-flags
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [Indirect Prompt Injection Surface]: The skill ingests data from external sources, specifically flag configurations and evaluation metrics via the
vercel flagsCLI. - Ingestion Points: Configuration data enters the context through
vercel flags inspect,versions, andevaluationscommands as described inSKILL.mdandreferences/cleanup.md. - Boundary Markers: While the skill provides structured guidance on how to interpret these values (e.g., choosing values to inline), it does not explicitly instruct the agent to ignore potentially malicious text embedded within flag descriptions or variant names.
- Capability Inventory: The skill has the capability to execute CLI commands (
vercel flags create/set/archive) and modify local source code (inlining values during cleanup). - Sanitization: The skill relies on the agent to correctly identify and inline flag values based on the gathered evidence, but does not specify automated sanitization for the flag metadata itself.
- [External Resource Downloads]: The skill references and provides instructions for installing the Vercel CLI and specific Vercel-authored SDKs.
- Evidence: Mentions of
pnpm i -g vercelandnpx skills add vercel/flags@flags-sdkinSKILL.md. - Context: These resources originate from a well-known service provider and are documented as standard prerequisites for using the feature flagging platform.
- [Credential Management]: The skill provides instructions for handling sensitive credentials like
FLAGS_SECRETand OIDC tokens. - Evidence:
SKILL.mdandreferences/cli.mddiscuss the use ofvercel env pullfor local development and the generation of override cookies. - Context: The skill explicitly instructs the agent: "Do not print secrets to the terminal, logs, or chat," which aligns with security best practices for handling sensitive environment data.
Audit Metadata