agent-panel-meeting
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 31, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a multi-round debate where the output of one agent is revealed and used as input for others (Rounds 2 and 4), creating a surface where malicious instructions from one 'role' could influence others.
- Ingestion points: SKILL.md (Round 2 and Round 4 reveal preceding panelist outputs to the entire panel).
- Boundary markers: Present. SKILL.md contains specific rules to treat panelist output as untrusted content and validate it (OWASP ASI07).
- Capability inventory: SKILL.md (allowed-tools include
execute_command,write_file,edit_file,create_file,run_build,run_tests). - Sanitization: Present. The skill requires validation of round outputs against the panelist's declared role and verification against an agent registry (
core/a2a/.well-known/agent-registry.json) before invitation. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is configured with the
execute_commandtool in its frontmatter, granting it the ability to run shell commands on the host system as part of the orchestration or synthesis process.
Audit Metadata