deploy-proxyware-fleet
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 31, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process external authentication challenges which could serve as a vector for indirect instructions.
- Ingestion points:
challengeNonceis ingested via WebSocket telemetry connections inSKILL.md(Example and Suggested Process section). - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no explicit delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore embedded commands within the nonces.
- Capability inventory: The skill allows
execute_command,write_file, andcreate_file(defined inSKILL.mdfrontmatter). - Sanitization: The skill mentions a guardrail (ASI05) against constructing launch arguments from network messages, but does not provide specific implementation logic for sanitizing the input strings.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references external resources and dependencies that must be verified by the user.
- Evidence: References the Docker image
depin/grass-light-node:v2.4.0and standard libraries like@solana/web3.jsandtweetnacl. - Context: The skill includes a specific guardrail (ASI04) advising the verification of images against official repositories to mitigate supply chain risks.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill involves the generation of node launch arguments and configuration files which are then used with tools like
execute_command. - Evidence: The
execute_commandtool is explicitly allowed in the frontmatter, and the 'Suggested Process' involves building and running containers. - [METADATA_POISONING]: There is a minor inconsistency between the skill's instructions and its metadata.
- Evidence: The
agents/openai.yamlfile mentions "Honeygain" in the short description, whereasSKILL.mdexplicitly instructs to deprecate and avoid legacy proxyware like Honeygain due to blacklisting risks.
Audit Metadata