deploy-proxyware-fleet

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 31, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process external authentication challenges which could serve as a vector for indirect instructions.
  • Ingestion points: challengeNonce is ingested via WebSocket telemetry connections in SKILL.md (Example and Suggested Process section).
  • Boundary markers: Absent; there are no explicit delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore embedded commands within the nonces.
  • Capability inventory: The skill allows execute_command, write_file, and create_file (defined in SKILL.md frontmatter).
  • Sanitization: The skill mentions a guardrail (ASI05) against constructing launch arguments from network messages, but does not provide specific implementation logic for sanitizing the input strings.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references external resources and dependencies that must be verified by the user.
  • Evidence: References the Docker image depin/grass-light-node:v2.4.0 and standard libraries like @solana/web3.js and tweetnacl.
  • Context: The skill includes a specific guardrail (ASI04) advising the verification of images against official repositories to mitigate supply chain risks.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill involves the generation of node launch arguments and configuration files which are then used with tools like execute_command.
  • Evidence: The execute_command tool is explicitly allowed in the frontmatter, and the 'Suggested Process' involves building and running containers.
  • [METADATA_POISONING]: There is a minor inconsistency between the skill's instructions and its metadata.
  • Evidence: The agents/openai.yaml file mentions "Honeygain" in the short description, whereas SKILL.md explicitly instructs to deprecate and avoid legacy proxyware like Honeygain due to blacklisting risks.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 31, 2026, 11:20 AM