render-webgl-threejs
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 31, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates the ingestion of external 3D scene data (GLTF/WebGPU assets) which represents a potential attack surface for indirect prompt injection via embedded metadata or structure.
- Ingestion points: Assets are processed through
GLTFLoader,DRACOLoader,MeshoptDecoder, andKTX2Loaderas described in the loading pipeline. - Boundary markers: The instructions explicitly require the agent to validate scene structure and asset URLs against an allowlist.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes file system tools (
write_file,edit_file,create_file) and command execution (execute_command) for rendering implementation. - Sanitization: The security guardrails mandate that the agent must not allow embedded GLTF extensions, such as scripts or cameras, to auto-execute.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references standard industry dependencies for its primary functionality.
- Fetches and manages Three.js, React Three Fiber, and the
postprocessinglibrary (pmndrs). - References specialized decoders like Draco, Meshopt, and KTX2, which are typically fetched during the build or asset loading phase.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes WebAssembly (WASM) binaries for high-performance asset decoding.
- Uses WASM-based decoders (Draco/Meshopt) to handle compressed geometry and textures.
- The author explicitly notes the risk of executing foreign code via these binaries and instructs the agent to bundle them from pinned, verified sources and reject untrusted origins.
Audit Metadata