supply-chain-security
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 31, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and processes untrusted metadata from external registries (such as descriptions and publisher claims) during MCP governance tasks.
- Ingestion points: Registry metadata and package descriptions ingested in the 'MCP registry governance' and 'ASI06 Context & Memory Poisoning' sections of SKILL.md.
- Boundary markers: The instructions advise the agent to treat this content as unverified, but do not specify technical delimiters or strict prompt boundaries for the ingested data.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
execute_command,run_build, andwrite_filetools, which could be targeted by successful injection. - Sanitization: The skill mentions schema validation for tool invocations but lacks explicit sanitization for the natural language metadata read from registries.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
execute_commandandrun_buildto perform core functions such as artifact signing via Sigstore/cosign and SBOM generation. This level of access is appropriate for the skill's primary purpose of CI/CD pipeline hardening. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Integrates well-known security tools and GitHub Actions from the CycloneDX and SLSA Framework repositories to generate software bill-of-materials and build provenance. These are recognized, reputable sources within the security industry.
Audit Metadata