cyxj-remotion-evolve
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to extract 'new decisions', 'corrected rules', and 'new methods' from conversation history and code diffs to update local documentation (e.g.,
CLAUDE.md,HARD_RULES.md). This creates a feedback loop where instructions provided during a chat session can become persistent rules for the agent in future sessions. - Ingestion points: Dialogue text,
git diffoutput, andgit logmetadata. - Boundary markers: The skill requires a 'Proposal -> Approval -> Write' workflow, providing a human-in-the-loop checkpoint, though it lacks automated sanitization for injected instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses file-write capabilities across the repository, including project configuration and agent-instruction files.
- Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of the ingested dialogue is mentioned beyond the manual approval process.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell commands to gather context about the project state.
- Evidence: The instructions explicitly call for running
git diffandgit logon the repository to identify changes for the 'Collection' phase. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill delegates complex processing tasks to 'child agents' (子代理).
- Evidence: The workflow involves spawning a separate agent context to perform consistency checks and file writes, which uses a 'burnable' window to manage context length. While this is a common architectural pattern, it involves dynamic task delegation.
Audit Metadata