schematics-pdf-analyser

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 18, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill explicitly instructs the agent to assume sudo privileges for system-level tasks. It directs the agent to install packages globally (npm install -g puppeteer) and manage background processes using pkill and nohup.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill triggers the automated installation of pymupdf and puppeteer from public registries. Although these are well-known libraries, the instruction to install them immediately with elevated privileges and without version pinning increases the system attack surface.\n- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The requirement to install and execute system-wide packages at runtime facilitates potential remote code execution from external sources.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface due to its data ingestion workflow:\n
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through PDF text extraction via PyMuPDF (described in SKILL.md).\n
  • Boundary markers: There are no defined delimiters or warnings to ignore instructions embedded within the extracted schematic text.\n
  • Capability inventory: The agent possesses extensive capabilities including bash command execution, sudo access, and file system write access.\n
  • Sanitization: The skill lacks logic to sanitize, escape, or validate the content extracted from PDF files before processing.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Jun 18, 2026, 02:56 AM