08-engage
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external sources, including LinkedIn posts, profiles, and Sales Navigator notifications, to generate comment drafts. This ingestion of third-party content creates a potential surface for instructions hidden within posts to influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Content is retrieved from live LinkedIn feeds, search results, and external profiles via Chrome automation or Apify actors (SKILL.md §A3, §B1).
- Boundary markers: While the instructions specify drafting in a specific 'author voice' and using quality gates, there are no explicit structural delimiters mentioned to isolate ingested post content from the agent's core instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write to local state files (
engage-state.json), update Notion pages, and trigger external web scrapers. - Sanitization: A quality gate (
anticopywriting-ai) is used to review output drafts, but no specific sanitization for incoming scraped data is described. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on third-party Apify actors for data extraction, which involves executing remote scraping logic.
- Evidence: The skill references
apimaestro/linkedin-posts-search-scraper-no-cookies,harvestapi/linkedin-post-search, andapimaestro/linkedin-profile-postsfor batch processing (SKILL.md §A3, §B1). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill processes complex CLI-style arguments to manage its execution environment and interactions with external tools.
- Evidence: The skill supports various flags including
--mode=targets|radar|log,--engine=chrome|apify, and--slot=morning|middayto control its operations (SKILL.md Frontmatter).
Audit Metadata