investigating-with-observability

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 13, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external observability backends, which presents a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through the outputs of metrics, logs, and traces APIs fetched by subagents (defined in agents/metrics-discovery.md, agents/logs-discovery.md, agents/traces-discovery.md, and agents/alertmanager-check.md).
  • Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit boundary markers or instructions that warn the agent to ignore potentially malicious instructions embedded within the ingested telemetry data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to execute shell commands (curl, jq, date) and dispatch further subagents based on its analysis of the ingested data.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of content sanitization or escaping of API responses before they are processed by the LLM to form hypotheses or next steps.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute curl commands to interact with VictoriaMetrics APIs. These commands are well-structured and use environment variables for dynamic configuration. Notably, the skill follows secure patterns by using a configuration file for authentication headers (VM_CURL_CONFIG) to avoid exposing credentials in command-line arguments.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 13, 2026, 03:44 PM