z-to-prd
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes potentially untrusted data from existing project documents and conversation logs to generate a PRD.\n
- Ingestion points: Data is pulled from
docs/design/<slug>-brief.md, the conversation history (referencingz-grill-with-docs), and codebase modules.\n - Boundary markers: Absent. No delimiters or instructions are provided to the agent to distinguish between the skill's instructions and potentially malicious content within the source documents.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill writes to the file system at
docs/prd/<slug>.mdand suggests executing shell commands for verification.\n - Sanitization: Absent. There is no mention of validating or escaping content from the ingested files before using it to generate the PRD.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to use the
fdcommand in the verification step to confirm the existence of the generated PRD file in thedocs/prd/directory.
Audit Metadata