cubrid-qa-fetch
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing local CLI tools such as
uv,just, andcurlwithin a specific local directory (/home/vimkim/temp/cubrid-qahome-fetcher). These tools are used for authenticated data retrieval and report generation. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's primary function is to fetch QA report pages from
qahome.cubrid.org. It includes logic to handle authentication and verify that the retrieved content matches the requested build to prevent analysis of stale or incorrect data. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: Because the skill processes external HTML content from the QA portal, it possesses an indirect prompt injection surface.
- Ingestion points: Raw HTML result pages and summary endpoints (e.g.,
viewShellTestResult.nhn,showFuntionRes.nhn) fetched fromqahome.cubrid.org(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore' instructions when the agent processes the fetched HTML content.
- Capability inventory: The skill allows shell command execution (
uv,just,curl) and file system writes to theruns/subdirectory (SKILL.md). - Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing or escaping the HTML content before it is analyzed by the agent.
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill demonstrates secure credential management by instructing the agent to read secrets only from environment variables (
CUBRID_QA_USER,CUBRID_QA_PASS) rather than hardcoding them or asking the user to provide them in the chat. It explicitly forbids the agent from echoing or logging the password value.
Audit Metadata