glab-config
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 3, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documents the
custom_headersfeature, which supportsvalueFromCommand. This allows the configuration of an external executable that runs once perglabprocess to provide header values, effectively serving as a command execution hook within the tool's lifecycle. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
valueFromCommandsource allows for the execution of arbitrary scripts or binaries. The documentation notes that if shell expansion is required, a shell must be invoked explicitly, which increases the risk of command injection if user-supplied data is incorporated into the configuration. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill manages configuration for
duo_cli_auto_downloadandorbit_cli_auto_download. These settings enable theglabCLI to automatically fetch and execute GitLab-provided binaries without interactive user confirmation. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from multiple sources including environment variables (e.g.,
GITLAB_TOKEN,GLAB_CONFIG_DIR) and local repository configuration files (.git/glab-cli/config.yml). An attacker who can influence these files or the environment could potentially manipulate the agent's behavior when it manages or reads the configuration. - Ingestion points: Environment variables and local
.gitconfiguration files (documented inSKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None; configuration keys are processed as raw strings.
- Capability inventory: The skill provides full access to
glab config set,get, andedit, which can modify global and local tool behavior. - Sanitization:
glabperforms basic validation against a canonical schema, but does not sanitize the contents of command-based header sources or token values.
Audit Metadata