glab-incident
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructs the agent to read incident data (titles, descriptions, comments) from GitLab using commands like
glab incident viewandglab incident list. This data is externally controlled and may contain malicious instructions designed to manipulate the agent's behavior. \n - Ingestion points: GitLab incident titles, descriptions, and comments are read into the agent's context through
glab incident listandglab incident view(referenced inSKILL.mdandreferences/commands.md). \n - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit boundary markers or instructions for the agent to ignore potentially malicious content within the incident data. \n
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to execute shell commands (
glab), perform network write operations to GitLab, and read local files using the--attachflag. \n - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the ingested incident content before it is processed by the agent. \n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill documents the use of the
--attach <path>flag for theglab incident notecommand, which allows uploading local files to GitLab incidents. While this is a legitimate feature of theglabCLI, it represents a data exfiltration vector if an attacker uses indirect prompt injection to trick the agent into uploading sensitive local files (e.g.,.env, SSH keys) to a GitLab repository controlled by the attacker.
Audit Metadata