openclaw-github-dedupe
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from GitHub issue and PR titles, bodies, and comments, which could contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent's autonomous decisions.
- Ingestion points: Data is ingested via
gh issue viewandgh pr viewwhich retrieve bodies, comments, and review threads (referenced inSKILL.md,agents/cluster-evidence-agent.md, andscripts/alias.sh). - Boundary markers: No delimiters or explicit instructions are provided to the agent to ignore potentially adversarial instructions embedded within the ingested data.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute
ghCLI commands to mutate repository state (merge, close, label), performgitoperations (branch, patch), and execute local tests (referenced inSKILL.mdandscripts/alias.sh). - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the external content is performed before it is passed to the sub-agent decision chain.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on a local bash script (
scripts/alias.sh) and the GitHub CLI (gh) to perform repository management tasks. In autonomous mode, the agent executes these commands without mandatory per-action user confirmation, relying on internal confidence scores and repo policy. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill's autonomous mode includes instructions to "patch the smallest implicated surface" and "run targeted local gates," which involves the generation and execution of code and tests at runtime based on external bug reports and PR descriptions (referenced in
SKILL.md).
Audit Metadata