thermo-nuclear-review-loop
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes potentially untrusted content from the repository and subagent outputs.
- Ingestion points: File content from the repository (e.g.,
REVIEW.md,AGENTS.md,CLAUDE.md), thegit diffof the changes being reviewed, and the text responses from thetnr-reviewersubagent. - Boundary markers: While the prompt template uses placeholders like
<resolved scope>, it lacks explicit instructions to the reviewer subagent to ignore or isolate potentially malicious instructions embedded within the code comments or documentation it is tasked to process. - Capability inventory: The skill has extensive capabilities, including executing shell commands via
gitand repository build/test suites, writing to the filesystem to implement fixes, and initiating cross-agent communication using theacpxtool. - Sanitization: The instructions do not define any mechanism for sanitizing or escaping content ingested from the repository or the subagent before it is used in subsequent commands or prompts.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to execute arbitrary repository build and test commands, as well as several
gitoperations (git diff,git status,git rev-parse). Although these are intended for legitimate development workflows, they provide a powerful execution surface that could be exploited if the agent is misled by malicious input in the code or review instructions.
Audit Metadata