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skills/viralcode/openwhale/remotion-server/Gen Agent Trust Hub

remotion-server

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 14, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The scripts/setup.sh script utilizes sudo to execute apt-get install or yum install for system-level browser dependencies required by Remotion. This represents a privilege escalation vector during the setup phase.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The scripts/create.sh script performs unversioned installation of several Node.js packages using npm install, including remotion, @remotion/cli, @remotion/tailwind, typescript, @types/react, and tailwindcss.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The scripts/create.sh script contains dynamic execution patterns where it generates multiple executable source files (src/Root.tsx, src/ChatDemo.tsx, src/index.ts) and configuration files (remotion.config.ts, tsconfig.json) at runtime using heredocs.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface through the processing of src/messages.json.
  • Ingestion points: External data is ingested via src/messages.json (created in scripts/create.sh).
  • Boundary markers: None identified in the template code for separating data from instructions.
  • Capability inventory: Subprocess execution via npm and npx, and file-system write access via shell scripts.
  • Sanitization: No validation or sanitization is performed on the content of the JSON data before it is rendered into the video components.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
May 14, 2026, 12:14 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — remotion-server