vibe-coder-sdlc
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill features an attack surface for indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted data from external sources that may be controlled by third parties.
- Ingestion points: Pull Request diffs are fetched and read via
gh pr diffinreferences/code-review-agent.md, and issue content is retrieved usinggh issuecommands inreferences/project-manager-agent.md. - Boundary markers: Absent. The sub-agent instructions do not provide delimiters or specific directives to ignore instructions that might be embedded within the external code or issue descriptions.
- Capability inventory: The agents possess the ability to execute shell commands (
git,gh), post public reviews and comments to GitHub, and modify local repository files such asREADME.mdorCHANGELOG.md. - Sanitization: Absent. There is no explicit logic to validate or sanitize the external data before it is interpolated into the agent's context for decision-making.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill heavily relies on shell command execution to perform its primary SDLC functions.
- Evidence: The
git-workflow-agent.md,code-review-agent.md, andproject-manager-agent.mdreference files contain numerous shell commands includinggit checkout,git commit,git push, and variousgh(GitHub CLI) subcommands for managing pull requests and issues. The Orchestrator also useslsfor tech-stack detection.
Audit Metadata