working-text
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's TypeScript scripts (e.g.,
scripts/docs-probe.mts,scripts/architecture/check-page.mts,scripts/architecture/lint.mts) include anensureBuiltfunction. This function automatically executesbun installto fetch Node.js dependencies from the skill'spackage.jsonif the built bundle is missing or determined to be stale based on file modification times. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The same scripts utilize a self-bundling mechanism where they invoke
bun buildat runtime to compile their own source code into a.builddirectory before executing the resulting JavaScript bundle. This is used to ensure high performance and dependency resolution. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted local data including Markdown documents, YAML configuration files, and repository source code. While the skill uses structured AST parsers for analysis, this creates a potential surface for indirect prompt injection if the files being reviewed contain instructions intended to influence the agent's behavior during documentation reshaping or review tasks.
- Ingestion points: Processes any Markdown file in a repository, the
architecture.ymldeclaration, and source code files (TS/JS) for symbol extraction. - Boundary markers: The scripts use AST-based segmentation (
mdast,babel) to isolate content, but the skill instructions do not specify explicit boundary markers for the agent when processing prose. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses file system read/write access (for updating architecture maps) and subprocess execution capabilities (specifically for its self-build/bundling logic).
- Sanitization: Employs robust structured parsers (
mdast-util-from-markdown,@babel/parser) to extract data from files, which mitigates simple injection attempts within the parsing logic itself.
Audit Metadata