doc-iplan-autopilot
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 1, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute a Python driver script via the Bash tool to manage the document generation lifecycle.
- Evidence:
python3 "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/tools/saga_driver.py" --layer 08_IPLAN --allow-skip-permissionsinSKILL.md. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions explicitly direct the agent to include a flag that bypasses user confirmation prompts for file operations. This is a deliberate reduction of security oversight to enable unattended operation.
- Evidence: "
--allow-skip-permissionslets the phases the driver dispatches write files without a permission prompt — unattended autopilot requires it." inSKILL.md. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an indirect prompt injection surface as it ingests untrusted data from multiple sources to generate project artifacts with significant system access.
- Ingestion points:
SKILL.mdidentifies input from user prompts, SPEC/TDD components, and existing IPLAN files. - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no instructions to use delimiters or ignore embedded instructions within the ingested data.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses the
Bashtool to execute scripts and write files to the project directory. - Sanitization: Absent; no validation or sanitization steps are documented before processing external content.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata