doc-iplan-autopilot

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 1, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute a Python driver script via the Bash tool to manage the document generation lifecycle.
  • Evidence: python3 "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/tools/saga_driver.py" --layer 08_IPLAN --allow-skip-permissions in SKILL.md.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions explicitly direct the agent to include a flag that bypasses user confirmation prompts for file operations. This is a deliberate reduction of security oversight to enable unattended operation.
  • Evidence: "--allow-skip-permissions lets the phases the driver dispatches write files without a permission prompt — unattended autopilot requires it." in SKILL.md.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an indirect prompt injection surface as it ingests untrusted data from multiple sources to generate project artifacts with significant system access.
  • Ingestion points: SKILL.md identifies input from user prompts, SPEC/TDD components, and existing IPLAN files.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; there are no instructions to use delimiters or ignore embedded instructions within the ingested data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill uses the Bash tool to execute scripts and write files to the project directory.
  • Sanitization: Absent; no validation or sanitization steps are documented before processing external content.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Aug 1, 2026, 08:55 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — doc-iplan-autopilot