skills/vm0-ai/vm0-skills/ironclad/Gen Agent Trust Hub

ironclad

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 14, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Employs curl to interact with Ironclad's API for listing and creating workflows, records, and webhooks. These commands utilize environment variables for instance configuration and authentication.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches contract documents from the configured Ironclad host and saves them to the local filesystem (/tmp/contract.pdf). While automated scans flagged this as a potential remote code execution risk, the skill documentation only covers the download operation without instructions to execute the resulting file.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an indirect prompt injection surface (Category 8) by ingesting untrusted data from an external platform (Ironclad).
  • Ingestion points: Data retrieved from the Ironclad API host ($IRONCLAD_HOST) in response to GET requests for workflows and records (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: None identified. The skill does not instruct the agent to treat data from the API as untrusted or separate it from system instructions.
  • Capability inventory: File system write access (/tmp), network operations (curl), and document downloading (SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization, validation, or escaping of the content returned by the API before processing.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Sensitive contract metadata and POST request bodies are written to temporary files in /tmp (e.g., /tmp/ironclad_workflow.json). This practice could lead to local data exposure in shared or insecure compute environments.
Recommendations
  • HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://$IRONCLAD_HOST/public/api/v1/workflows/ - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
May 14, 2026, 12:56 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — ironclad